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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ROBERT GAYLE ANDREASON, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 44626
Cassia County No. CR-2015-4020
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Has Andreason failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it sentenced him to 15 years with three years determinate upon his
conviction for sexual battery of a child?
ARGUMENT
Andreason Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
The state charged Robert Gayle Andreason with sexual battery of a child age

16 or 17 years, rape, battery with intent to commit rape, and intimidation of a witness.
(R., pp. 53-55, 112-14.) As part of a plea agreement, he pled guilty to sexual battery
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and the state dismissed the other three counts. (R., pp. 116-17, 123-25, 143; 07/26/16
Tr.) The district court imposed a sentence of 15 years with three years determinate.
(R., pp. 139-41.) Andreason timely filed a notice of appeal from the entry of judgment.
(R., pp. 156-58.)
On appeal, Andreason claims his sentence “is excessive in light of the mitigating
evidence in this case.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) Review of the record, however, shows
this argument to lack merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard

considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001)
(citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

C.

Andreason Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must

establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.
State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To establish that the
sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not
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conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of
protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736,
170 P.3d at 401.

In determining whether the appellant met his burden, the court

considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is
exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion
will be the period of actual incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d
387, 391 (2007).
Andreason, then age 46, engaged the 16-year-old daughter of a family friend in
an extended sexual relationship whereby the teenaged girl became pregnant. (PSI, pp.
2-6, 40, 59-62.) The district court expressed its duty in sentencing, including that it
must “first consider the good order and protection of society,” and must also consider
the facts of the crime, mitigation information, and the evaluations to determine the
“appropriate sentence.”

(10/04/16 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 9-20; p. 28, Ls. 1-8.)

The court

considered the nature and seriousness of the crime, concluding that it would not
consider some of the claims by the victim contested by Andreason, and would consider
only the fact that the crime arose out of an inappropriate sexual relationship with an
underage victim. (10/04/16 Tr., p.21, L. 21 – p. 23, L. 16; p. 23, L. 22 – p. 25, L. 3; p.
27, Ls. 11-25.)

The court considered the mental health, GAIN and psychosexual

evaluations. (10/04/16 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 17-20; p. 25, L. 4 – p. 26, L. 25.) The district
court also considered all of the mitigation evidence and arguments, including that it was
Andreason’s second felony conviction, that Andreason had been a victim of physical
and sexual abuse as a child, that he indicated he was taking responsibility, and his
history of employment. (10/04/16 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 21-22; p. 27, Ls. 1-10.) The district
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court’s findings support its exercise of discretion and the reasonableness of the
sentence.
On appeal Andreason argues the sentence is “excessive in light of the mitigating
evidence in this case.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.) He contends the “most notable
mitigating factor” is the “background of this crime.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) The state
utterly fails to comprehend how the fact that a 46-year-old man engaged in a monthslong sexual relationship with a 16-year-old girl, resulting in her pregnancy, is a
mitigating factor, much less a “notable” one. He points out that the victim at some point
asserted she had been forcibly raped or raped after being involuntarily drugged
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7), claims that the district court ultimately rejected for purposes of
sentencing (10/04/16 Tr., p. 22, L. 14 – p. 23, L. 7; p. 27, Ls. 11-25). That the crime
was not as awful as initially reported by the victim is not mitigating.

Moreover,

Andreason’s claim that the relationship was “a mutual loving relationship” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 7), was rejected by the district court (10/04/16 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 11-15 (“The child
was under age and he should have known better, and he did know better, but he says,
oh, well.”); p. 23, L. 22 – p. 24, L. 23 (noting the “highly coercive and corrosive impact
on a young person from sexual conduct that's inappropriate”); p. 25, Ls. 17-25
(Andreason engaged in “grooming behaviors”)). That Andreason even on appeal is
indulging his perverse fantasy that he is involved in a love story rather than an act of
sexual predation is the opposite of mitigating.
Andreason next relies on his assertions of accountability and remorse, his
prospects for rehabilitation, his difficult childhood, and his productivity in life.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.)

The district court considered these mitigating factors,
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however.

(10/04/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 1-10.)

Andreason has failed to show that the

mitigating evidence required a lesser sentence than he received.
Andreason, age 46, engaged in a months-long sexual relationship with a 16year-old girl, resulting in her pregnancy. The sentence of 15 years with three years
determinate was reasonable. Andreason has failed to show an abuse of discretion on
appeal.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district
court.
DATED this 31st day of May, 2017.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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